COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE CRACKS OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM

Donald J. Smythe*

Almost seventy years after the Supreme Court sought to rationalize
the American system of judicial federalism in Erie, sales law remains
trapped in a pattern more reminiscent of the Swift v. Tyson era. The
extraordinarily wide separation of powers in the NCCUSL-ALI uniform
law-making process has entrenched Article 2 of the UCC in the status quo.
Concurrently, an imbalance between the federal and state courts in the
American system of judicial federalism has conferred an unusually wide
range of discretion over state commercial law on the federal courts.
Ironically, therefore, state sales statutes are being reinterpreted and revised
by the federal courts rather than the state legislatures or state courts. The
federal courts are thus the most important source of innovation and
experimentation in modern American sales law, but the role they play is
not entirely consistent with modern notions of democracy and judicial
restraint. Moreover, it is debatable whether they have, in exercising their
discretion, brought much rationality and coherence to the law or simply
injected uncertainty and disharmony instead. At this point it appears that
the pattern will persist. Thus, it seems inevitable that American sales law
will continue to diverge, not only across jurisdictions but further and
further away from the rickety framework of Article 2. American sales law
therefore will not only continue to devolve into something more akin to
the common law, it will remain an area of disjunction in which the federal
courts play the dominant role in developing the law, even though the law
is still formally within the authority of the states.
August, 2006

* J.D., University of Virginia; M.Phil., Ph.D., Yale University; B.A., M.A., Carleton
University. Address all correspondence to Donald J. Smythe, Associate Professor of
Economics and Law, Huntley Hall, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA
24450. Email: smythed@wlu.edu

2
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION….…………………………………............................................................3
I.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF JUDICAL FEDERALISM…………….……………….......7

II.

THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION………….13
A. Comparative Institutional Analysis………………………….………………..13
B. The Uniform Law-Making Process and the Inordinate Discretion of the Federal
Courts…………………………………………………………………………….23

III.

THE FEDERAL COURTS AND MODERN SALES LAW CONTROVERSIES………………..34

A. Computer Software and the Scope of the UCC……………………………...34
B. Hill v. Gateway and the Rolling Contracts Controversy…………………….44
C. Failures of Limited Remedies and Exclusions of Consequential Damages…60
D. Summary……………………………………………………………………..73
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………...76

3
INTRODUCTION
Modern American sales law is rife with controversy.1 There is an ongoing debate
about such fundamental matters as the scope of Article 2, the rules governing the
formation of sales contracts, the dearth of consumer protections, and the role of the
federal courts in construing the law.2 The recent attempts to revise Article 2 have thus far
ended in failure, and at this point it remains unclear whether sales law in the United
States will remain uniform in the years ahead.3 Other authors have attributed the current
dilemma to the commercial law-making process.4 While this article fully concurs, it
argues that the deficiencies in the commercial law-making process are deeply rooted in
the peculiarities of American judicial federalism. The wide separation of powers over the
enactment of new commercial law statutes together with an imbalance in the structure of
American judicial federalism have left Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
deeply entrenched in the status quo while at the same time conferring an unusually wide
range of discretion on the federal courts over the interpretation of state sales statutes.5 As
a consequence, American sales law is being reinterpreted and revised not through the
uniform law-making process but through the decisions of the federal courts.

1

This was reflected in the title and subject of the recent Association of American Law Schools Conference

on Commercial Law at the Crossroads, June 14-17, 2005 held in Montreal, Canada.
2

See the discussion infra part III.

3

Some prominent scholars have expressed skepticism. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of

Article 2, 62 LA.L REV. 1009 (2002).
4

Id. See also, Allan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143

U.PA.L.REV. 585, 639 (1995).
5

See the discussion infra part II.

4
From a long-run perspective, what matters most is not so much the substance of
the law itself at any point in time as the mechanisms for adapting and revising it in the
face of the new problems and pressures created by social and economic changes.6 As a
general matter, the law can be revised through the enactment of new statutes or through
the decisions of courts. In a federal system of government such as in the one in the
United States new statutes can be enacted at the federal or state levels and decisions can
be made by both federal and state courts. The Constitution of the United States clearly
assigns the authority to enact statutes in certain areas of the law to the federal government
and leaves other areas to the states.7 The scope of federal authorities has expanded quite
significantly over time, however, both because of underlying social and economic
changes and because the Supreme Court has tended to interpret the federal authorities
more broadly (perhaps because of the underlying social and economic changes).8
Consequently, most commercial law today is within the scope of the federal
government’s constitutional authority over interstate commerce, yet, for historical
reasons, most commercial law statutes are still enacted by state legislatures. It is ironic,
therefore, that the most important source of innovation and change in modern American
sales law is from federal court decisions that reinterpret the state statutes.

6

This is one of the main themes and concerns of new institutionalist economic historians, such as Douglas

North, Gary Libecap, and Lee Alston.

See, e.g., DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
7

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

8

This has occurred most notably through an expansion in the federal government’s commerce clause

powers. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUSTEIN, AND MARK V.
TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 189-233 ((1996) for an overview.

5
It is not, however, without historical precedent.

Indeed, the federal courts

frequently sought to fashion general rules of commercial law that often departed from the
state common law throughout the nineteenth and well into the twentieth centuries. The
Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to their efforts in Swift v. Tyson.9 Unfortunately, the
federal courts’ efforts failed to bring rationality and uniformity to American commercial
law and merely exacerbated forum-shopping and all its injustices instead. The Supreme
Court ultimately overruled Swift v. Tyson in Erie v. Tomkins10 and held that the federal
courts must follow state court precedents on questions of state law. Erie purported to
bring an end to an era in which the federal courts sought to develop a body of general
common law. As other scholars have documented, it was at best a mixed success.11 It is
widely acknowledged that the federal courts continue to develop a body of general
common law through their interpretations of federal statutes.12
It is much less widely acknowledged, however, that the federal courts continue to
play an important role in the development of state law, especially state commercial law.
Indeed, the federal courts continue to render holdings on questions of state law that
sometimes clearly contradict state statutes and state court precedents and that
subsequently influence the development of state law.13 Nowhere is this more glaringly

9

Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).

10

Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

11

See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law 83 NW.U.L. REV. 805 (1989) and Caleb Nelson, The

Persistence of General Law, 105 COLUM.L.REV. 503 (2006).
12

Id.

13

Thus, the federal courts play an important role in the development of state common law generally. As G.

ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND
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apparent than in the field of sales law. Ironically, in spite of all of the lofty ideals of
judicial federalism that the Supreme Court laid out in Erie, commercial law – and sales
law in particular -- remains rooted in the Swift era.14 Erie may have clarified that the
federal courts are supposed to abide by state court precedents on questions of state law,
but the federal courts continue to exercise almost unbridled discretion over the
interpretation of state commercial law statutes, in some cases rendering holdings that
clearly contradict the statutes in their efforts to bring rationality and coherence to modern
American sales law.15
The first part of this article offers an overview of modern developments in
American judicial federalism and argues that it has left an imbalance in the relative
powers of the federal and state courts. The second part draws on the comparative
institutional analysis of the separation of powers in a Constitutional democracy to explain
how this imbalance in American judicial federalism has resulted in the federal courts
having far more discretion over the interpretation of state laws than the state courts,
particularly within the sphere of commercial law. On the one hand, this means that the
federal courts have been an important source of experimentation and innovation in the
law at a time when new technologies and commercial practices have created pressures for
significant legal reform; on the other hand, it also means that the federal courts are
NATION, 20 (1988) observe, “Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 1938 overruling Swift, the
impact of federal courts on the common law has continued…. Because federal courts confront common law
issues, they contribute to the development of the common law, and state courts may draw upon their rulings
in enunciating common law principles.”
14

See the discussion infra parts II and III.

15

See the discussion infra parts II and III.
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playing a far more prominent role in the process of reforming commercial law than either
the state courts or the state legislatures. The third part illustrates the consequences by
examining three prominent areas of controversy in modern sales law that have arisen
from the federal courts’ exercise of their judicial discretion. As the discussion elaborates,
the federal courts have been at the heart of debates about computer software and the
scope of Article 2, the rules governing the formation of sales contracts, and the
consequences of the failure of limited remedy clauses. The final section concludes.

I.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF JUDICAL-FEDERALISM

Erie was a pivotal case. It shifted the fault lines in the American system of
judicial federalism and stymied a burgeoning body of federal common law,16 which was
already beginning to spawn an unwholesome degree of forum shopping by the early
twentieth century.17 The Supreme Court has subsequently worked out an important body
of jurisprudence governing the appropriate choice between federal and state rules in
federal diversity cases and state cases arising under federal law. It is now clear that
federal courts are supposed to apply state statutes and precedents when answering

16

This is not to deny that the federal courts still create federal common law through their interpretations of

federal statutes or that they still play an important role in interpreting state law. See Weinberg, supra note
11 and Nelson, supra note 11 for an overview of federal common law in the post-Erie era.
17

This was cited by the Court in Erie. As Justice Brandeis wrote, “Swift v. Tyson introduced grave

discrimination by non-citizens against citizens. It made rights enjoyed under the unwritten “general law”
vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or the federal court; and the privilege of
selecting the court in which the right should be determined was conferred upon the non-citizen….The
discrimination resulting became in practice far-reaching.” Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.
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questions that arise under state law and state courts must follow federal statutes and
precedents when answering questions that arise under federal law.18

There are, in

addition, sophisticated tests for making the appropriate choices of law when procedural
questions bear on substantive legal outcomes.19

18

IRWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 266-67 (1989) has summarized the Court’s

jurisprudence as follows: “if state and federal law are inconsistent, the following questions must be asked.
First, is there a valid federal statute or Federal Rule of procedure on point….If so, then the federal law is to
be applied, even if there is a conflicting state law. If there is not a valid [Federal] statute or Rule of
procedure, the second question is whether the application of the state law in question is likely to be
determinative of the outcome of the lawsuit. If the state law is not outcome determinative, then federal law
is used. But if the state law is deemed to be outcome determinative, then the third question is asked: is
there an overriding federal interest justifying the application of federal law?”
19

In addition to Erie, the Court has developed a series of tests to answer complicated questions that arise

when federal courts must decide whether to follow federal or state procedures in diversity cases. In an
early case, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (in diversity cases the outcome of the litigation
should be substantially the same as if tried in a state court), the Court proposed an “outcome-determinative”
test. In subsequent cases, especially Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525 (1958)
(if the state practice is bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties a federal
court should follow state practice; if not, a federal court may follow federal practice if there are affirmative
countervailing considerations of federal judicial administration), and Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965) (in the absence of a federal rule or statute, a federal court should follow the state practice if
following the federal practice would lead to forum-shopping or inequitable administration of the laws), the
Court has modified Guaranty Trust and developed a multilayered approach that inquires first into the
existence of relevant federal procedural rules and then applies a modified outcome-terminative test. For a
summary, see Id.

9
The case law since Erie has thus constructed a framework within which
fundamental questions about the roles of the federal and state courts can be answered. In
spite of all the nuances of this sophisticated jurisprudential edifice, however, there is still
a gaping crack in its foundations. If a state court incorrectly applies federal law the
losing party can in theory appeal the decision all the way to the Supreme Court of the
United States, and the Supreme Court therefore has ultimate authority over all questions
arising under federal law; if a federal court incorrectly applies state law in a diversity
case, however, the losing party has no right of appeal to the state supreme court, and the
state supreme courts do not, therefore, have ultimate authority over all questions arising
under state law.20 Of course, the federal courts are obliged to follow state statutes and
precedents, and if novel questions arising under state law come before them they are
supposed to predict how the state supreme court would respond.21 Moreover, some states

20

The state courts might have the opportunity to overrule a federal holding on a question of state law if the

same question happens to subsequently come before them. Although that has happened, it is far from likely
and will not necessarily result in a reopening of the case. It did result in a reopening of the case in Pierce v.
Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975) (for a discussion, see Note, Pierce v. Cook: Rule 60(b)(6) Relief
from Judgment for Change of State Law in a Diversity Case, 62 VA. L. REV. 414 (1976) and Note, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b): Standards for Relief from Judgments Due to Changes in Law, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 646 (1976), but in some other cases, such as DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir. 1994) it
did not. Some states allow federal courts to certify questions of state law to the state supreme court for an
answer, but this procedure is not always available and there is no requirement that the federal courts must
take advantage of it even if it is. For a discussion, see STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE
288-92 (1996).
21

The Supreme Court has held that a federal court may not decline to hear a case simply because of

uncertainty as to the relevant state law. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236, 238 (1943). In
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allow federal courts to certify questions to the state supreme court for definitive
interpretations of state law.22 But in practice, the imbalance has given the federal courts
degrees of freedom in interpreting state law that the state courts do not have in
interpreting federal law.23 This has had especially significant consequences for recent
developments in commercial law, and lies at the heart of the controversy over recent
attempts to amend Article 2 of the UCC.
It is easy to forget that Swift v. Tyson was a commercial law case. Under the
doctrine the Supreme Court established in Swift, the federal courts sought to achieve
uniformity in commercial law through holdings that looked beyond the narrow
provincialism of any one state’s laws.24 In this regard, their decisions reflected the
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1965) the Court stated that “If there be no decision
by [the state supreme court] then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after
giving proper regard to relevant rulings of other courts in the state. In this respect, it may be said to be, in
effect, sitting as a state court.” This peculiar arrangement invited the following quip by Judge Friendly in
Nolan v. Transocean Air Lanes, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960)), a case that raised a difficult question
about the choice of state law in a federal diversity case: “Our principal task is to determine what the New
York courts would think the California courts would think on an issue about which neither has thought.”
22

About half the states allow certification. For a discussion, see PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES,

FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 307 (1994).
23

The losing party in a federal diversity case could always appeal to the Supreme Court on the grounds that

the federal court’s interpretation of state law violated Erie, but the Supreme Court would be extremely
unlikely to grant a writ of certiorari in such a case.
24

In Swift, the Court held that the section of the Judiciary Act that directed the federal courts to look to “the

laws of the several states” for legal authorities in diversity cases was meant to be “strictly limited to local
statutes and local usages” and that it did not extend to “contracts and other instruments of a commercial
nature, the true interpretation and effect whereof are to be sought not in the decisions of the local tribunals,
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dominant jurisprudential tradition of the time. Under the theory of natural law that
prevailed during the antebellum period, certain legal principles were thought to transcend
jurisdictional boundaries and provide rules of law common to all courts in all
jurisdictions.25 This was especially true in the area of commercial law, which was
thought to be rooted in the ancient law of the merchant and governed by usage of trade
and underlying principles of commerce.26 In appealing to these broader authorities,
federal judges simply believed they were constructing their interpretations of the law
correctly, rather than devising a separate body of federal commercial law.27 Indeed, there
was an understanding of the great value of uniformity in commercial laws implicit in
their appeal to these broader principles.28 When federal courts rendered holdings that
but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence” Swift, 41 U.S at 19. The doctrine
was subsequently extended to questions in tort in Baltimore & Ohio RR. V. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893)
and to questions in property in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910) but it is significant that it
arose out of a case in commercial law.
25

The medieval conception of natural law, which was based on the “premise that any positive law that

violated natural law was void,” had long since been marginalized.

MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE

TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 156 1870-1960. In the Classical legal jurisprudence that
emerged in the nineteenth century “natural rights discourse structured legal argument by suggesting starting
points, background assumptions, presumptions, or first principles in the law.” Id. at 158.
26

The great British jurist, Lord Mansfield attempted to institutionalize the reference to mercantile custom

by relying on a jury of merchants. HOLDSWORTH, SOME MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAW, 160-175
(1938).

According to Karl Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV.L.REV. 725 (1939),

however, the law of sales never fully incorporated mercantile custom.
27

As Weinberg, supra note 11 at 824 put it, in Swift Justice Story “was aiming for uniform commercial law

– and better commercial law than he found under the …common law of New York.”
28

Id.
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rejected or ignored state court holdings they were trying to achieve legal unification
through the development of a system of “general commercial law” that cohered with the
underlying principles of commercial transactions.29
Federal court holdings on state questions that clearly diverged from state
authorities were not, however, consistent with twentieth century theories of democracy
and judicial restraint.30

Indeed, the current imbalance in judicial federalism is also

inconsistent with fundamental principles of democracy and judicial restraint, since it
allows federal courts to render holdings on state questions that are not subject to a right of
appeal to the state supreme courts. This places them beyond the system of checks and
balances that normally helps to ensure judicial accountability and restrain the scope of
judicial discretion in a constitutional democracy.31 The federal courts have exercised

29

Justice Story, who wrote the Court’s opinion in Swift, had earlier been an advocate of legal codification

in Massachusetts. See Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common–Law World 25
YALE J.INT.L 435 (2000). In Swift, 41 U.S. at 18 Story held that federal courts could declare rules for
“general commercial law” in a manner consistent with Lord Manfield’s dictum that commercial law is “not
the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world.” As Weinberg, supra note 11 at 824
observed, “Story hoped …that uniformity would follow.”
30

As Justice Brandeis noted in Erie, 304 U.S. at 72, “The federal courts [under Swift] assumed, in the

broad field of general law, the power to declare rules of decision which Congress was confessedly without
power to enact as statutes.” At least until some time in the twentieth century, it was clear that the federal
government’s commerce powers did not extend to all commercial activities. Nonetheless, Swift authorized
the federal courts to create general commercial law without regard to the scope of federal commerce
powers. This was the unconstitutional course of conduct authorized by Swift to which Brandeis alluded in
Erie. Id. at 77-78.
31

See the discussion infra, section II.
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their discretion quite freely, particularly in interpreting Article 2.32

While this has

promoted experimentation and innovation in the law and militated against legal
obsolescence, it has also begun to undermine the uniformity of American sales law.33

II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE SCOPE OF
JUDICIAL DISCRETION

A. Comparative Institutional Analysis
In any constitutional democracy some degree of discretion must be accorded to
the judiciary. There can be no rule of law unless the courts have the authority to interpret
statutes and precedents free from the control of political officials.34 Yet if the courts were

32

See the discussion infra, in section III.

33

Justice Brandeis cited the failure of the Swift doctrine to achieve uniformity in Erie 304 U.S. at 74:

“Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of common law prevented uniformity; and
the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general law and
that of local law developed a new well of uncertainties.”

Indeed, divergent judicial decisions have

frustrated the objectives of commercial codification since the turn-of-the-twentieth century. See WALTER
P. ARMSTRONG, A HISTORY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 50 (991). The argument below
suggests, however, that the inordinate discretion of the federal courts on questions of state law has created
very particular problems for the development of sales law.
34

See ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 211-39, 365-367 (2000) for an

overview. As Cooter notes, the system of justice in a dictatorship, such as the former Soviet Union, has
been referred to as “telephone justice,” presumably to invoke the metaphor of the executive telephoning a
judge to direct her disposition of a case. Id.
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granted complete autonomy to interpret the laws without any checks against their
exercise of discretion or any system of judicial accountability, they could fashion the
laws without regard to the will of the electorate, and the rule of law could become little
more than a façade for totalitarianism.35 The framers of the U.S. Constitution thought
very carefully about the role of the judiciary as well as the legislative and executive
branches of government, and sought to restrain the power of each through a well-defined
system of checks and balances.36 Indeed, the system of government the framers devised
was a creative and original response to the potential pitfalls in a republican form of

35

In a true theocracy, for instance, there is no separation of powers and all branches of government are

subordinate to the law of the prevailing religion. A theocracy may, therefore, veer towards a kind of
totalitarianism in which the people are subordinate to the legal dictates of their religious leaders. Indeed,
MANFRED HALPERN, THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA 134-155 ((1963) coined the term “neo-Islamic totalitarianism” to refer to the Muslim
fundamentalist forces at play in the Middle East over forty years ago. That characterization has been
challenged (see e.g. Michael Whine, Islamimism and Totalitarianism: Similarities and Differences, 2
TOTALITARIAN MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL RELIGIONS 54 (2001)) but, in light of recent
experience in the Middle East, particularly in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, the analogy remains
highly relevant.
36

William Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18

J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975) argue that an independent and neutral judiciary is essential to enforcing the
bargains between competing interests in the democratic process. From the perspective offered here, it is
naive to think that the judiciary can be truly independent and neutral. Indeed, the separation of powers
between the executive and legislative branches inevitably confers political power on the judiciary. As long
as the judicial appointment process is subject to political control, therefore, it will be impossible for the
judiciary to remain truly independent and neutral.
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government. In that regard, the U.S. Constitution was an experiment in democracy as
well as the product of political theory and compromise.37
The U.S. Constitution thus provides a useful model for understanding the role of
the judiciary in a constitutional democracy. The framers invested legislative powers in
the Congress, but divided them between the House of Representatives and the Senate.38
Moreover, the President was given the power to veto new legislation, subject to a two
thirds majority override;39 this veto provision confers some de facto legislative power on
the executive branch of government as well as the legislature. Any new legislation
requires a bargain -- a bargain between both Houses of Congress as well as the

37

The actual history of the Constitutional convention reminds one of the old quip about sausages – “better

eaten than seen in the making” – but the outcome was a remarkably intricate and novel legal document,
whether by design, happenstance, or something in between. Some popular histories may overemphasize
the wisdom of the drafters (see e.g. CAROL BERKIN, A BRILLIANT SOLUTION: INVENTING THE
AMERICAN

CONSTITUTION

(2003),

CATHERINE

DRINKER

BOWEN,

MIRACLE

AT

PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, MAY – SEPTEMBER
1987 (1986), or CHARLES L. MEE, THE GENIUS OF THE PEOPLE (1987)), but this should not detract
from the unique character of the constitutional structure they devised.
38

U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-7. As Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better Than

One? 12 INT.REV.LAW & ECON. 145-62 (1992) argues, the separation of legislative powers between an
upper and lower house also has important implications for the relative powers of the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches. A separation of legislative powers between two houses in a bicameral legislature
increases the difficulty of a legislative bargain; it thus also makes it less likely that the legislature will be
able to override any veto of new legislation by the executive branch, or that it will be able to enact a
statutory amendment to overrule judicial interpretations of the law that depart from legislative intent.
39

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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President.40 At least fifty percent of the members of each of the two houses of the
legislature must agree to the bargain as well as the President; if the President refuses to
participate in the bargain and vetoes the new legislation then a bargain between two
thirds of the members of the two houses is necessary to override the veto and enact the
new legislation. This separation of powers ensures that all new legislation will have a
broad base of political support.41 It also means that new legislation is difficult to enact,
and that the American system of government tends to favor the status quo.
The American system of government favors the status quo not only because the
U.S. Constitution requires so much legislative bargaining to enact any new proposals but
also because legislative bargaining is costly.42 The political parties’ control of the House
and Senate is not strong enough to ensure that members will vote along party lines and so
legislators’ votes often have to be “bought” with promises of support for the legislators’
own favored initiatives, important committee assignments, or a myriad of other favors,
40

The discussion here draws on the bargaining model presented by COOTER, supra note 34 at 211-39.

41

Of course, the broad base of political support might derive in large measure from bargains among the

legislators. Lobby groups and special interests will often succeed in having special interest legislation
enacted, but usually as part of some omnibus bill. In fact, the possibility of enacting special interest
legislation in such a manner increases the potential scope of legislative bargains.

If a coalition of

legislators is too small to force a bill through the legislature, they might be able to “buy” other legislators’
support by promising to attach special interest legislation that provides specific benefits to the other
legislators’ constituency (e.g. funding for a new bridge or a new research institute). This kind of “pork
barrel politics” is often the subject of derision, but, ironically, it can help to facilitate the enactment of other
socially desirable legislation. Of course, if the entire legislative process is dominated by special interests,
there is little hope that the outcomes will serve the public welfare. Id.
42

Id.
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both small and large.43 The transactions required to gain legislative support for any new
proposal will usually consume a significant amount of the legislators’ scarce time and
energy. These transaction costs may well preclude many potentially gainful bargains and
inhibit legislative enactments. In general, the higher the transaction costs of legislative
bargaining, the more the legislative process favors the status quo
The separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, and the
transaction costs of legislative bargaining, have an implicit effect on the powers of the
judiciary. The scope of judicial discretion is ultimately constrained in two ways: first, by
the power of the executive and legislative branches to overrule controversial judicial
holdings by enacting new legislation, and second, by the powers of the executive and
legislative branches over judicial appointments.44 Since the U.S. Constitution separates
the power to enact new legislation so widely, the political bargains necessary to overrule
the courts will be difficult to achieve. American courts thus generally have a wide range
of discretion to interpret the federal laws -- a much wider range of discretion than the
courts in many other countries.45 Indeed, not all constitutions require so much bargaining
to enact new legislation. In the British political system, for instance, the executive (the
prime minister) is the member of the legislature (parliament) who has the support of a

43

Id.

44

Id. at 225-34.

45

See Robert Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, Division of Powers in the European Constitution in THE NEW

PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, (John Eatwell et al. eds. 1998) and Mark J. Ramseyer
& Eric Rasmussen, Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan, American Law
and Economics Association Annual Meeting (1996).
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majority of its members.46 There is no separation of powers between the executive and
legislative branches, and thus new legislation does not require as difficult and costly a
bargain as in the U.S. In general, therefore, British courts can be overruled more easily
than American courts and the British political system does not confer as much discretion
on the courts as the American political system.47
The wide scope of judicial discretion in the U.S. has made the judicial
appointment process (at the federal level, at least) much more political than in Great
Britain and Europe.48 Indeed, in keeping with the theory of checks and balances upon
which the U.S. Constitution was based, the framers also separated the power over federal
judicial appointments between the executive and legislative branches. The President was
given the power to nominate federal judges and justices and the Senate was given the
power of advice and consent.49 Of course, the rules governing the tenure and terms of
appointment for judges, the circumstances under which they can be impeached, and the
46
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assignment of the powers of reappointment are also important to the restraint of judicial
discretion.50 Although the U.S. Constitution confers lifetime tenure on justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States,51 the terms of appointment for federal judges is left
to the discretion of Congress (subject, of course, to the President’s veto power).52
As long as the judicial branch is truly independent, the judiciary will come to
exercise some degree of discretion in any constitutional democracy.53 If the power to
enact new legislation is separated very widely and if there are no limits on the tenure and
terms of appointment of judges and justices, the judiciary will tend to have a wide range
of discretion.54 It will be able to exercise this discretion to interpret the laws in ways that
the executive and legislative branches did not intend and are therefore not in accord with
democratic principles, narrowly conceived.55 It will also be able to exercise its discretion
to break the law free of the status quo. In this regard, the separation of powers allows the
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judicial branch to serve as a source of legal innovation and experimentation, and offer an
important check against legal obsolescence.56
Guido Calabresi has used the term “legal obsolescence” to characterize the
problem that arises when a statute is ill-fitted to modern circumstances and lacks
legislative support.57 He argues that obsolescent statutes often cannot be revised or
repealed, presumably because of the difficulties of achieving the legislative bargain that
would be necessary to enact new legislation. Most interestingly, Calabresi argues that the
exercise of judicial discretion can help to alleviate the problem. From his perspective, the
wide separation of legislative powers and the transaction costs of legislative bargaining
not only cause legal obsolescence, they also confer discretion on the judiciary that the
judiciary can – and should – use to militate against the legal obsolescence. It is difficult
to dispute his claim that the wise use of judicial discretion over the interpretation of
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obsolete statutes could increase social welfare. Of course, it is easy to imagine how the
ill-advised use of that discretion could be socially detrimental.
The U.S. Constitution constrains the federal government from using the terms of
appointment for Supreme Court justices to limit the scope of discretion exercised by the
Supreme Court,58 and Congress has not used its control over the terms of appointment for
federal judges to limit the discretion of the lower federal courts either.59 The scope of the
state courts’ judicial discretion depends largely, of course, on the separation of powers in
the state constitutions and the transaction costs of bargaining within the state political
systems. Although most states’ constitutions separate the power to enact new legislation
in a manner similar to the U.S. Constitution, the states generally limit the tenure of state
supreme court justices60 as well as state judges,61 and so control over appointment and
tenure is a much more important check against the exercise of judicial discretion at the
state level than the federal level. Since many state judges and justices are elected, this
control is often exercised by state voters.62
The state constitutions and governments therefore typically exercise more
restraint over state judiciaries than the federal Constitution and government exercise over
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the federal judiciary.

Moreover, the relatively high transaction costs of political

bargaining at the federal level, on both constitutional and legislative matters, probably
allows the federal judiciary to exercise more discretion on federal legal questions than the
state judiciaries can exercise on state legal questions.63

Of course, if state courts

misapply federal law they can always be overruled by the Supreme Court, and so this also
constrains the state courts’ exercise of discretion on questions of federal law. But there is
no similar constraint on the federal courts’ exercise of their discretion over questions of
state law. In practice, the federal courts’ discretion over questions of state law is virtually
unchecked by any system of accountability to elected officials -- state or federal. Of
course, the state legislatures have the power to overrule errant federal court
interpretations of state statutes, but on questions of commercial law, where the states
have subordinated their usual legislative autonomy to a uniform law-making process even
this check against the federal judicial power is virtually ineffective.

B. The Uniform Law-Making Process and the Inordinate
Discretion of the Federal Courts
The peculiar history of uniform law-making in the U.S. has resulted in the federal
courts having more discretion over the interpretation of the commercial laws than the
state courts. The U.S. Constitution confers authority over interstate commerce on the
federal government,64 but otherwise leaves matters of contract, property, torts, and crime
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to the states.65 Commercial law has thus traditionally been within the states’ sphere of
authority.

This was a workable arrangement in the eighteenth and even into the

nineteenth centuries, before the canals and railroads created a truly national market, but
by the late nineteenth century, as the mass-production manufacturing industries emerged
in the wake of the transportation revolution that allowed firms to sell their products in
distant states,66 the pressures to unify the law of commerce across the states became
much more intense.67 It was not at all clear, however, whether the interstate commerce
powers of the federal government were broad enough to justify commercial codification
and unification through federal legislation; most late nineteenth century business and
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political leaders believed they were not.68 Regardless, there were significant political
impediments to federalizing commercial law throughout the twentieth century.69
The initial impetus to unify the commercial laws manifested itself through the
newly-formed American Bar Association (ABA). In 1881 the Alabama Bar Association
created a committee to make recommendations about legal unification and to advance the
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cause in other states.70 Then in 1889 L.D. McFarland, the president of the Tennessee Bar
Association, advocated a process for achieving legal unification across the states in his
annual address.71 McFarland’s address led to the establishment of a committee which
advanced the issue at the ABA’s annual meeting in Chicago in 1889.72 The president of
the ABA at the time was David Dudley Field, who had already drafted the “Field Code”
and was a strong advocate of legal codification.73 He appointed a special committee to
investigate the matter further.74 Although attendance at the special committee meetings
was poor, the committee submitted a report to the ABA which recommended that the
ABA request its members to prepare bills for passage in their state legislatures which
would provide for the appointment of commissioners to advance the uniformity of state
laws.75
In 1890, the ABA adopted a resolution which accepted the committee’s
recommendations and led to the establishment of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).76 The NCCUSL’s mandate was to
further the codification and unification of laws across the states by sponsoring the
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drafting of model legal codes and encouraging state legislatures to adopt them.77 It
initially sponsored a series of model commercial codes, many of which were drafted by
legal academics, including the Uniform Sales Act, which was drafted by Karl
Llewellyn.78 The NCCUSL process, however, was one which left formal authority over
commercial laws in the state governments, and few of the model commercial codes were
widely adopted as drafted.79 Moreover, the objectives of legal unification appeared to be
frustrated from early on by divergent judicial interpretations of the uniform statutes.80
The NCCUSL initially sought to enhance uniformity in the judicial interpretations
of its bills by including within them provisions which mandated uniformity in
interpretation.81 The problem persisted, however, and in 1929 the NCCUSL published a
report on the various judicial decisions interpreting the Negotiable Instruments Law,
which had been one of its most widely adopted uniform model codes, in which it
observed that “The whole fabric, the very conception of uniformity, was being menaced
77
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by the strange attitude of the courts….[T]he courts, on identical statutes, were reaching
diametrically opposite conclusions; cases from other states on the precise point were
being ignored; the very statute was ofttimes neglected…”.82 Although this was well
before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Erie, it might just as easily have
been stated in a much more recent report.83
The early attempts at commercial codification were thus a mixed success at best.84
Well before the middle of the twentieth century, however, a series of Supreme Court
opinions had made it clear that the federal government’s commerce powers were
sufficient for commercial codification to proceed through federal legislation.85 Some
influential lawyers and academics began to advocate unification of sales law through
82
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Id. at 51-52.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the challenge that divergent interpretations posed to commercial

uniformity well before Erie: in Commercial National Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-Louisiana Bank and
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federal legislation.86 In 1922 the ABA drew on Samuel Williston’s talents to draft a
federal sales bill.87 Although this was never enacted, powerful interests groups such as
the Merchant’s Association of New York continued to lobby for federal action.88 Some
prominent academics, such as Karl Llewellyn, also advocated unification through federal
legislation.89 William A. Schneider, the president of the NCCUSL at the time, however,
was a states’ rights advocate, and he urged further attempts at unification through the
NCCUSL process.90

The NCCUSL, this time in conjunction with the American Law

Institute (ALI), subsequently initiated the Uniform Commercial Code project.91 The
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was subsequently adopted by all states, and became
the first (and only) true success of the NCCUSL-ALI law-making process.92 Proponents
of states’ rights, who had often resisted codification through the NCCUSL process, were
finally forced to concede to commercial codification out of a fear that, if they
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successfully resisted further attempts through the NCCUSL-ALI process working at the
state level, legislation would be enacted at the federal level, and the states would suffer a
further erosion of their traditional spheres of authority.93
The peculiar history of legal codification in the U.S. has resulted in a peculiar
institutional framework for commercial law-making. The states retain formal authority
over commercial law, but de facto authority over commercial law amendments has been
delegated to the NCCUSL-ALI law-making process. This has worked well enough for
most parts of the UCC, but not for Article 2.94 As the recent attempts to amend Article 2
have shown, the wide range of interests at stake and the wide bargain required for any
successful amendments, preclude the process from producing truly substantive changes.95
93
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The only amendments that can survive the bargaining process are the ones that are noncontroversial and there is thus little incentive for state legislatures to enact them.96
Indeed, even if the NCCUSL-ALI process did produce meaningful amendments to
Article 2, lobbying by interested business and consumer groups at the state level would
probably impede many state legislatures from adopting them, and the uniformity of the
code would be compromised anyway.97 The de facto power over the enactment of new
sales legislation has been far too widely separated to permit an easy revision process.
The diffuse power over the enactment of new sales legislation confers a wide
range of discretion over the interpretation of Article 2 on both the federal and state
courts.98 In practice, however, the range of discretion conferred upon the federal courts is
much wider than that conferred upon the state courts. Federal judges and justices are
appointed by federal officials. Barring any cause for impeachment, federal judges and
justices may serve may serve indefinitely.99 Neither are subject to periodic review and
reappointment. Even if they were, they would be subject to reappointment by federal
officials rather than state officials. State judges and justices are often elected,100 and even
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if they are appointed by elected officials, they are usually only appointed for limited
terms.101 They are therefore usually subject to replacement, reappointment, or reelection
on a periodic basis.

Most importantly of all, they are subject to reappointment or

reelection by state officials or state voters, not by federal officials. In short, federal
judges and justices are completely beyond the control of the individual states’ electorates;
state judges and justices are not.
Since federal court rulings on questions of state law cannot be appealed to state
courts, and since neither elected state officials nor the states’ electorates have any control
over the appointment or reappointment of federal judges and justices, the federal courts
actually have a wider range of discretion over the interpretation of state law than the state
courts. This is a phenomenon associated with the exercise of the federal courts’ diversity
jurisdiction generally.102 In the field of commercial law, however, and especially the subfield of sales law, the problem is much more acute. The impossibility of a state court
overruling a federal court’s interpretation of a state statute, and the difficulty of
overruling federal interpretations of sales statutes through the NCCUSL-ALI process,
together with the absence of any check on federal judicial discretion through periodic
reappointment and/or renewal of federal judges, means that the federal courts have
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almost unbridled discretion in their rulings on any questions arising under Article 2.103
Whether their autonomy is unwholesome is a matter open to debate. On the one hand, it
creates the potential for an exercise of judicial discretion that is inconsistent with modern
notions of democracy and judicial restraint, but, on the other hand, it allows the federal
courts to militate against the legislative obsolescence that otherwise tends to result from
the strong bias in favor of the status quo that is inherent in the NCCUSL-ALI process.
There is, in fact, a trade-off implicit in the role the federal courts currently play in
the development of commercial law. The wide discretion the federal courts enjoy in
interpreting state commercial law statutes and their immunity from any oversight or
control by the state electorate or elected state officials clearly raise questions about the
role of the federal judiciary, yet, given the difficulty of revising Article 2 through the
NCCUSL-ALI process and the inertia that would otherwise leave modern sales law in the
grip of the status quo,104 the federal judiciary is also the most important source of
innovation and experimentation in modern sales law.

It is clear that the most

controversial interpretations of Article 2 within the last several years have been rendered
by federal courts.105 In some cases federal courts appear to have consciously used their
discretion in attempts to fashion new rules in accord with evolving commercial practices
and standards rather than simply interpret the statutes as drafted.106 Ironically, they
103
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appear to be acting out of similar motivations to those federal courts in the nineteenth
century that, under the authority of Swift v. Tyson, disregarded state commercial law
holdings and instead appealed to the broader principles and imperatives of commerce in
attempts to fashion uniform rules of commercial law.107
The peculiarities of the commercial law-making process in the United States in
conjunction with the unique American system of judicial federalism thus place the federal
courts in a unique and important position. In some ways the role they play is similar to
the role of traditional common law courts. While many might contend that this is
undemocratic, some scholars have argued that the common law process is not only more
innovative but ultimately more efficient than the statutory law-making process that has
largely replaced it.108 Whether the federal courts’ exercise of their discretion is for good
or ill will ultimately depend on the consequences. As the following discussion suggests,
however, at this point it has only exacerbated the tendency toward contention and
disunity in modern American sales law. Moreover, in some cases the courts’ exercise of
their discretion has been so bold that it challenges conventional notions about the role of
the judiciary and the scope of federal judicial powers.
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III.

THE FEDERAL COURTS AND MODERN SALES LAW CONTROVERSIES

A. Computer Software and the Scope of the UCC
One of the stumbling blocks in recent efforts to amend Article 2 has concerned its
scope, specifically whether it should extend to transactions in computer software and
other forms of computer information.109

The matter was the primary subject of a

controversial ruling in 1991 by Judge Weis of the Third Circuit in Advent Systems
Limited v. Unisys Corp.110 Advent Systems involved two corporate parties, the named
principals in the case. Unisys contracted with Advent to provide the software and related
hardware for the document systems that Unisys was planning to sell with its computers in
the US market.111 Under the terms of the contract Advent was also obligated to provide
sales and marketing materials and assistance with the construction and installation of the
document systems.112

The contract period was for two years with a provision for

automatic renewal or termination by notice.113 Unisys, however, was restructuring and,
perhaps as a consequence, decided that it wanted to develop its own document system. It
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informed Advent that “their arrangement had ended.”114 Advent sued alleging breach of
contract.
At trial, the court applied Pennsylvania law, with the agreement of both parties.115
The trial judge decided that Pennsylvania common law should apply to the contract rather
than Article 2, and the jury found Unisys liable for damages of over $4m for breach of
contract.116 Unisys appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in applying Pennsylvania
common law rather than Article 2, that the contract was not enforceable against Unisys
under the statute of frauds provision in UCC § 2-201 because the writing lacked a
quantity term, and that, even if it was enforceable, the contract lacked sufficient
definiteness upon which to base a remedy.117 Under Pennsylvania common law, the
statute of frauds did not bar Advent from enforcing the contract, nor did Advent’s claim
fail for lack of a reasonably certain basis for providing a remedy. The case thus turned on
the trial judge’s decision to apply the common law.
Judge Weis began by invoking the predominant factor test, although he did not
explicitly refer to it as such.118 He looked first to the language of the writing, and noted
that it began with a statement that described Unisys’s objective under the agreement as
being to “purchase” and Advent’s as being to “sell” certain of Advent’s hardware
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“products” and software licenses for “resale”.119 He noted that a subsequent heading
described the subject matter of the transaction as a “sale” and that the section there-under
also used the words “buy” and “sell” and “products” -- words which are all generally
indicative of a contract for the sale of goods rather than a contract for services.120 He
noted that Advent was supposed to invoice Unisys for each product purchased and for
maintenance fees separately.121 The charge for Advent’s support services was to be 3%
per annum of the list price of each software module sold by Unisys.122 Some additional
services were to be provided at no cost.123 The relatively small share of the charges for
services was also indicative of a sales contract.
This would have been enough for the court to rule that the contract was one for
the sale of goods rather than the supply of services, but Judge Weis proceeded to render a
holding about the nature of software generally.

He characterized software as “the

medium that stores input and output data as well as computer programs” where the
medium is in the form of a hard disk, floppy disk, or magnetic tape.124 Judge Weis noted
the voluminous academic commentaries on the nature of software and observed that most
of it favored the view that software was a good within the meaning of the UCC § 2-
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102.125 Moreover, he noted that defining software as a good would bring transactions in
software within the scope of Article 2 generally and that this would serve to unify the
body of law applied to disputes arising from computer software transactions.126 In his
view, this was a strong policy argument for including transactions in computer software
within the scope of Article 2. He therefore went beyond simply ruling that the contract in
dispute was one for the sale of goods and held that “software is a good within the
definition in the Code.”127
It is far from obvious that Judge Weis was pleased with the implications of this
holding for the case at hand. The statute of frauds provision for Article 2 in UCC § 2201(1) clearly states that “A writing … is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond
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the quantity of goods shown in such writing.”128 This was an impediment to Advent in
seeking enforcement of the contract because the writing executed between Advent and
Unisys had no quantity term. Of course, as Judge Weis noted, UCC § 2-201(1) states
only that a contract under Article 2 is not enforceable beyond the quantity shown, not that
a quantity must be shown for a contract to be enforceable.129 Although the plausibility of
this interpretation has been acknowledged by some commentators,130 it has not been
widely followed.131 Judge Weis therefore eschewed that approach in favor of another
that drew an analogy between the contract between Advent and Unisys and an exclusive
requirements contract. Judge Weis reasoned that, although the contract between Advent
and Unisys was nonexclusive, it was similar to an exclusive requirements contract in
many ways.132 Since Article 2 does not require an output term in exclusive requirements
contracts,133 Judge Weis held that an output term was not strictly required for Advent to
enforce its contract with Unisys.134
Judge Weis’ reasoning on this point was tenuous at best. Although UCC § 2-306
does not strictly require an output term in an exclusive requirements contract, that is
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clearly because the buyer’s requirements can be used as a good faith proxy. Indeed, UCC
§ 2-306(1) states that “A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or
the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur in
good faith…”.135 The UCC thus makes it clear that the good faith requirements of the
buyer in an exclusive requirements contract are to be treated as equivalent to a specific
output term. Since the contract is for the buyer’s exclusive requirements, there are no
other suppliers to which the buyer can turn, and the buyer’s good faith requirements are a
reasonable proxy for a specific output term. The contract between Advent and Unisys,
however, was not an exclusive requirements one.136

Hence, Unysis’ good faith

requirements could not have been a reliable proxy for the contract’s output term since
Unysis was apparently free to satisfy its requirements from other suppliers. Judge Weis’
analogy between the contract in Advent Systems and an exclusive requirements contract
stretches the scope of UCC § 2-306 well beyond anything the drafters could have
intended.
It also does an end run around the statute of frauds requirements in UCC § 2201.137

There is clearly some ambiguity about the wording of UCC § 2-201(1).

Nonetheless, the comments to UCC § 2-201 seem to make it clear that UCC § 2-201(1)
was meant to imply that a quantity term is required for a contract to be enforceable. As
official comment 1 notes, “The only term which must appear is the quantity term which
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need not be accurately stated but recovery is limited to the amount stated.”138 And later,
“Only three definite and invariable requirements as to the memorandum are made by this
section…. third, it must specify a quantity.”139 The buyer’s good faith requirements in an
exclusive requirements contract are, by the express provisions of UCC § 2-306(1),
sufficient to satisfy the output requirement in UCC § 2-201(1). But there is no statutory
basis for holding that the buyer’s good faith output in a nonexclusive requirements
contract is sufficient to satisfy the output requirement. Judge Weis’ opinion is not
consistent with a plain reading of the Code.
Advent Systems faced yet another hurdle in its attempt to recover from Unisys in
UCC § 2-204(3).140 UCC § 2-204(3) states that a contract does not fail for indefiniteness
even though one or more terms are left open if “the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonable certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”141 This
suggests, of course, that a contract does fail if there is not a reasonably certain basis for
giving an appropriate remedy. With no output term in the contract, Advent could not
easily prove its damages. Judge Weis did not attempt to resolve the matter; instead, he
remanded the case to the lower court for a determination as to whether the contract
provided a reasonably certain basis for calculating Advent’s damages.142

He did,

however, frame the inquiry for the trial court by suggesting that a sound basis for
calculating damages might be found by estimating what Unisys’s good faith output
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requirements would have been.143 Here again Judge Weis drew on an analogy to an
exclusive requirements contract. As official comment 2 to UCC § 2-306 states, “Under
this section, a contract for output or requirements is not too indefinite since it is held to
mean the actual good faith output or requirements of the particular party.”144
The problem with this analogy, once again, is that the contract between Advent
and Unisys was not an exclusive requirements one. Hence, Unisys’s good faith output
requirements could not serve as a reliable proxy for an output term and they did not
provide a reasonably certain basis for calculating Advent’s damages. One cannot help
but suspect that Judge Weis points the district court in this direction to avoid the
potentially harsh consequences for Advent of his holding that the contract was for the
sale of goods rather than services.
Advent was awarded damages at trial in a contest that was adjudicated under
Pennsylvania common law. Judge Weis overturned the trial court and held that Article 2
applied to the case and indeed would apply to any case in which computer software was
the predominant factor in the contract. Yet Judge Weis’ sympathies clearly lay with
Advent. Unisys reneged on the deal and Advent was left in the lurch. There is little
doubt that Advent lost the benefit of a bargain. But by holding that Article 2 applied to
the case rather than the common law, Judge Weis exposed Advent to a potential bar to its
enforcement of the contract from the statute of frauds.

Judge Weis’ creative

interpretation of UCC § 2-201(1) prevented Advent from facing a strict bar to
enforcement, but Advent was still exposed to the risk that its suit would fail for lack of a
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reasonably certain basis for providing a remedy. Judge Weis thus went to the trouble of
suggesting to the trial court (and Advent) how the contract might be construed to provide
a reasonably certain basis for calculating a remedy, again drawing on the dubious analogy
with an exclusive requirements contract. By all appearances, Judge Weis went to great
lengths to help Advent out of the bind in which he put them by deciding the case under
Article 2 instead of the common law.
As Judge Weis made clear, his decision to apply Article 2 was driven by
utilitarian calculations.145 Indeed, his calculations had less to do with the case at hand
than with the scope of Article 2 generally. He could easily have decided that, under the
predominant factor test, the contract between Advent and Unysis was primarily for
services rather than goods and simply upheld the district court. And he could have held
that the contract was primarily for goods and applied Article 2 without rendering an
opinion about the nature of computer software in general. But it would have been
difficult for Judge Weis to hold that computer software is a good and that the contract
between Advent and Unisys was primarily one for services. Since Weis clearly wanted
to extend the scope of Article 2 to computer software, he was forced to apply Article 2 to
the contract as a consequence. But since his sympathies in the case appeared to lie with
Advent, he also fashioned an unusual justification for excluding the effect of the statute
145
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of frauds and even suggested how the district court might construe a reasonable basis for
calculating Advent’s damages in the absence of any reliable proxy for an output term.
It is debatable whether Judge Weis’ efforts to bring transactions in computer
software within the scope of Article 2 were to good effect. In spite of Judge Weis’
utilitarian calculations, some commentators believe Article 2 is ill-suited to transactions
in computer information.146 For one things, transactions in computer information usually
only involve the transfer of a license, not a fee simple absolute. This makes the warranty
provisions of Article 2 somewhat inappropriate.147

Indeed, the NCCUSL and ALI

approved the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) in 1999
specifically for transactions involving the transfer of rights in computer information.148
Although UCITA has not been widely adopted,149 it only exists because there was a
widespread view that neither the common law nor Article 2 provides adequate
governance mechanisms for computer information transactions. At this point, Judge
Weis’ holding in Advent Systems has not been widely followed,150 but if it is, it may
simply force computer information transactions into a legal box they do not fit.
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B. Hill v. Gateway and the Rolling Contracts Controversy
Few commercial law cases have raised as much controversy as Judge
Easterbrook’s opinion in Hill v. Gateway.151 The case involved two consumers, Rich and
Enza Hill, who ordered a personal computer from Gateway over the telephone.152 At the
time of the telephone order, the Hills were apparently not given notice of any special
contract terms or otherwise informed that the manner of contracting would differ from
the norm in any way.153 The Hill’s computer arrived in a box, however, and the box
included a writing which purported to list additional contract terms.154 One of the terms
was an arbitration clause, which obliged the Hills to submit any disputes to arbitration if
they retained possession of the computer for more than thirty days.155 The Hills did
retain the computer for more than thirty days before complaining about some of its
components and its performance.156 Gateway was unable or unwilling to address their
complaints to their satisfaction and so they filed suit in a federal district court asserting
claims under Illinois sales law.
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At trial, Gateway asked the district judge to enforce the arbitration clause and
dismiss the suit.157 The judge refused, and Gateway initiated an interlocutory appeal
under 9 U.S.C. Section 16(a)(1)(A).158 The case thus came before Judge Easterbrook on
the question of the validity of the arbitration clause. Easterbrook vacated the district
court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to compel the Hill’s to submit
their case to arbitration.159 His disposition of the question has not only provided an
important precedent for other courts to consider, it has also initiated an ongoing debate
about merits of a new theory of contract formation -- the theory of “rolling contracts.”160
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion has been widely criticized and for a variety of reasons. But
many of the criticisms have been so obvious that Judge Easterbrook must have
anticipated them. Because of that, and because of the great esteem in which Judge
Easterbrook is held, Hill v. Gateway deserves a careful analysis, and Judge Easterbrook‘s
reasoning should be accorded considerable respect.
Judge Easterbrook essentially follows ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.161 In ProCD
the Seventh Circuit held that under Illinois law a customer who bought software that was
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on a CD contained in a box was bound by contract terms inside the box after the
customer had an opportunity to read the terms and reject them by returning the
software.162 The Hills attempted to distinguish their case from ProCD to no avail. They
first argued that ProCD should be limited to software.163 Judge Easterbrook was not
convinced. As he put it, “ProCD is about the law of contract, not the law of software.”164
Next they argued that ProCD was an executory contract and its precedential effect should
be limited to executory contracts.165 Judge Easterbrook correctly observed, however, that
the contract in ProCD was no more executory than the contract between the Hills and
Gateway.166 In fact, sales contracts are usually executory for at least some time, since
there are usually warranties that extend for a considerable duration.
At oral argument, the Hills noted that in ProCD the software packaging included
writing on the exterior that provided notice of additional terms inside.167 Thus, since the
software was sold through retail stores, any customer who purchased it should have had
notice of the additional terms before making the purchase.

The box containing

Gateway’s computer did not provide such notice.168 Judge Easterbrook attributed the
difference to the differences in the functionality of the boxes in the two cases: one was
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for display, whereas the other was only for delivery.169 He thus implied that the writing
on the box was irrelevant. Finally, the Hills argued that they were consumers, whereas
the customer in ProCD, Zeidenberg, was a merchant.170 Thus, the additional terms inside
the software packaging became part of Zeidenberg’s contract with ProCD under UCC §
2-207(2), but in their case the additional terms inside the box containing the computer did
not become part of their contract with Gateway.

Judge Easterbrook dismissed the

argument as inapt: the question was not whether additional terms should be added to the
contract, but when the contract was formed.171
Judge Easterbrook thus construed the case as one about the time of the formation
of the contract. Since the Seventh Circuit had already addressed a similar question in
ProCD, and since Judge Easterbrook viewed ProCD as a controlling case, there was little
need for further consideration of the Hill’s claim.172 Nonetheless, Judge Easterbrook
elaborated on the policy rationale for his holding in his dicta.173 In his view, the Hills
must have known that important contract terms would be included in the packaging when
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they ordered their computer.174 He noted that Gateway’s ads stated that their computers
came with a limited warranty and lifetime support.175 Presumably, the Hills must have
known that the precise terms of the warranty would be provided inside the packaging of
their computer upon the computer’s delivery. By implication, therefore, they should have
known that other important contract terms might also be included inside the packaging.
Easterbrook noted that the law provides consumers with three principal ways of
finding out about the specific terms of their contracts.176 First of all, they can ask the
vendor to provide the specific terms before making their purchase.177 Thus, the Hills
could have requested the information before making their telephone order. Second, they
can avail themselves of the vast amount of information available from public sources,
such as vendors’ websites, consumer publications, etc.178 The Hills presumably could
have found out about the arbitration clause merely by doing a little research beforehand.
Finally, consumers can simply read the information that vendors include inside the
packaging of their products, including any information about the precise contract terms.
The Hills clearly had an opportunity to do so; Judge Easterbrook suggests that, by
keeping the computer for more than thirty days, they thus impliedly accepted the contract
arbitration clause.179
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Easterbrook implies that any inconvenience to consumers caused by the burden of
having to research the terms of their contracts are outweighed by the practical advantages
of allowing vendors to include contract terms in the packaging of their products.180
Indeed, in his view, it would be highly impractical to expect all vendors to provide
complete information about all contract terms prior to their customers’ purchases. As he
explained, 181
Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers before
ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the phone for direct-sales
operations such as Gateway’s had to read the four-page statement of terms
before taking the buyer’s credit card number, the droning voice would
anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers. Others would
hang up in a rage over the waste of their time. And oral recitation would
not avoid customers’ assertions…that the clerk did not read term X to
them….
As one would expect, Easterbrook’s reasoning is compelling.

Some have

doubted, however, whether the practical difficulties of providing customers with
information prior to their purchases are as great as Easterbrook claims.182 According to
Honnold and Reitz,183 for instance, there is no practical difficulty for sellers in
“disclosing, or at least outlining, rights-negating terms at the point of sale… whether by
180
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telephone, email, or in-store.” But Judge Easterbrook seems to have a point. First of all,
it is not at all clear whether a seller would provide sufficient information to satisfy the
formalities of contract by merely outlining right-negating terms. Second, it is not even
clear whether basic information about complex contract terms can be adequately
communicated via telephone.

Customers simply may not be able to comprehend

significant amounts of information about complex contract terms communicated over the
telephone. Indeed, attempts to contract around the usual contract rules in such a manner
might well be considered unconscionable. And finally, telephone orders in particular
raise difficult evidentiary problems. It is not clear how the seller could prove that every
customer always received all the information. Even if all telephone orders were recorded
it would still be difficult to prove that the customer correctly heard every contract term.
Moreover, compelling sellers to record every telephone order and establish a suitable
system for storing and retrieving the recordings would put them to considerable expense.
Nonetheless, on its face, Hill v. Gateway appears to misapply the UCC. This is
ironic, because Article 2 is quite liberal in general about the formation of contracts. UCC
§ 2-204(1) states that a contract may be made in “any manner sufficient to show
agreement.”184

The official comment explains that this continues the policy of

recognizing any manner of expression -- oral, written, or other -- as sufficient to form a
contract, subject, of course, to other rules governing the legal effect of such expressions,
such as the parole evidence rule.185 Even the parties’ conduct can be sufficient to form a
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contract if it is construed as recognizing the existence of an agreement.186 Indeed, UCC §
2-204(2) states that a contract may be formed even though the “moment of its making is
undetermined.”187 As the official comment explains, this recognizes that the interactions
of the parties might be sufficient to form a contract without clearly indicating the precise
point at which the formation occurred.188 UCC § 2-206(1)(a) complements UCC § 2-204
by obliging courts to construe offers as inviting acceptance “in any manner and by any
medium

reasonable

in

the

circumstances”

unless

otherwise

“unambiguously

indicated.”189 As the official comments elaborate, “this section is intended to remain
flexible and its applicability to be enlarged as new media of communication develop or as
the more time-saving present day media come into general use.”190
UCC §§ 2-204(1), 2-204(2) and 2-206(1)(a) by themselves thus appear to provide
a statutory basis for Easterbrook’s Hill v. Gateway holding. Under UCC § 2-204(1) a
court could construe Gateway’s delivery of the computer, complete with the terms on the
writings inside the packaging, as an offer. Under UCC § 2-206(1)(a) Gateway’s thirty
day window for rejecting the terms by returning the computer could be construed as
inviting acceptance through the Hills’ conduct -- the failure to return the computer within
the time specified in Gateway’s offer. This would be consonant with the policy stated in
the official comment to UCC § 2-206 of extending the UCC’s flexible formation rules to
a present day medium -- the telephone -- as it comes into more general commercial use.
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Indeed, even if Gateway had not provided a thirty day window for returning the
computer, under UCC §§ 2-204(2) and 2-206(1)(a) a court might have construed the
Hill’s decision not to return the computer within a reasonable time as acceptance, even
though the precise time of formation might have been indeterminable.
But UCC §§ 2-204(1), 2-204(2), and 2-206(1)(a) do not stand by themselves.
Although Article 2 is in general quite liberal about the formation of contracts, it provides
a specific rule in cases where a party makes a telephone order -- or, indeed, makes an
order to buy goods of any kind. UCC § 2-206(1)(b) states that, “unless otherwise
unambiguously indicated,… an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current
shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or
by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or nonconforming goods….”.191 On its
face, this appears to oblige courts to construe a telephone order, such as the one made by
the Hills, as an offer to buy goods. The offer should presumably be construed as one to
buy goods subject to the usual rules of commercial contracting under Article 2, unless it
is made in such a way as to clearly modify them. Thus, one should presume that the
buyer intends to retain all of her rights under the warranty of title in UCC §2-312 and the
warranties of quality in UCC §§ 2-313, 2-314, and 2-315, as well as all of her rights to
remedies for breaches of those warranties elsewhere in Article 2, unless she indicates
otherwise in making her order. The seller’s prompt or current shipment of the goods
must be construed as an acceptance of the buyer’s offer, and unless the seller
unambiguously indicates otherwise, the buyer is entitled to all of the usual warranties and
remedies available under Article 2.
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A seller is nonetheless not compelled to accept all of the usual rules governing the
buyer’s rights and remedies. As UCC § 2-206(1)(b) explains, “shipment of nonconforming goods does not constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the
buyer that the shipment is offered only as an accommodation to the buyer.”192 It is not
entirely clear what this means, but the wording suggests that the seller can contract
around the buyer’s usual rights and remedies. UCC § 2-106(2) defines conforming goods
as goods “in accordance with the obligations under the contract.”193 Nonconforming
goods are thus presumably goods that are not in accordance with the seller’s obligations
under the contract. But 2-206(1)(b) states that if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer
that the shipment is only an accommodation to the buyer, the seller’s shipment of
nonconforming goods does not constitute an acceptance. If it does not constitute an
acceptance then there is no contract to which the goods can conform and this part of UCC
§ 2-206 does not make much sense. The reference to “the shipment of nonconforming
goods” in UCC § 2-206(1)(b) is thus best understood as meaning a shipment that is not in
accordance with the seller’s obligations under the terms of the buyer’s offer. In a typical
telephone order, the terms of the buyer’s offer would normally include all of the default
rules of Article 2.

If the seller notified the buyer that the shipment was only an

accommodation, however, and not an acceptance, the formation of the contract would be
delayed. The seller could include writings with the shipment of goods that defined the
terms of an offer; the buyer’s conduct (such as retaining possession of the goods for more
than thirty days) could then constitute an acceptance of the offer.
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Indeed, even if the seller did not explicitly contract around the usual default rules
of Article 2 in this manner, there is a qualification placed on both parts (a) and (b) of
UCC §§ 2-206(1) by the words, “Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the
language or circumstances.”194 These qualifying words provide the strongest rationale
available under Article 2 for Judge Easterbrook’s Hill v. Gateway holding, although
ironically it is not a rationale that Easterbrook himself explicitly stated. They imply that
if the circumstances of a telephone order unambiguously indicate that the seller’s
shipment of goods does not operate as an acceptance of the buyer’s offer then UCC § 2206(1)(b) is inapplicable. Although Easterbrook did not explicitly develop this line of
reasoning, his opinion leaves little doubt that he believes consumers who make telephone
orders usually understand that the seller may include additional contract terms in the
packaging and that the seller’s shipment of the goods does not therefore constitute an
acceptance of the buyer’s offer.195 Whether the circumstances of a telephone order
“unambiguously indicate” that the seller’s shipment of the goods does not operate as an
acceptance is another matter. Most of Easterbrook’s critics presumably believe there is
sufficient ambiguity to make the qualification inapplicable.
If this qualification to UCC § 2-206(1)(b) does not apply, then the contract was
formed when Gateway shipped the computer and it did not include the terms that
Gateway included inside the packaging, such as the arbitration clause. Under Article 2,
these were additional terms in an acceptance, subject to UCC § 2-207. UCC § 2-207
194
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important terms…”. Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1150.
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provides two rules for such situations: the “last shot” rule in UCC § 2-207(2) and the
“knock out” rule in UCC § 2-207(3).196 This has created some confusion and controversy
about when the particular rules are meant to apply. Official comment 1 explains that
UCC § 2-207 is meant to apply in two situations: the first in which an agreement has
been reached but one or both parties send memoranda that include terms in addition to
those agreed upon, and the second in which the parties do not clearly reach an agreement
on any terms but agree to transact, and then exchange memoranda -- or
“acknowledgements” -- that contain different terms.197

The classic scenario for the

second situation is the one in which the parties exchange standard forms. According to
official comment 2, UCC § 2-207(2) -- the “last shot” rule -- applies to the first situation - the one in which an agreement has been closed -- and, by implication, section 2-207(3) - the “knock out” rule -- applies to situations in which an agreement on terms has not
been reached, such as in the case of an exchange of standard forms.198
Setting Judge Easterbrook’s holding aside, and supposing that Article 2 as
construed here applies instead, it is not precisely clear which of the two rules should
apply in the Hill v. Gateway situation. The parties did not dicker or negotiate over the
terms of their agreement, but a contract appears to have been formed nonetheless under
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197

U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt 1 (2005).

198

U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt 2 (2005).

56
UCC § 2-206(1)(b). Since the parties did not exchange standard forms, the case for
applying the last shot rule may seem the strongest. Nonetheless, official comment 7
states that “in many cases, as where goods are shipped, accepted and paid for before any
dispute arises, there is no question of whether a contract has been made…[and]….the
only question is what terms are included….”.199 According to official comment 7, in
such a case “subsection (3) [the knock out rule] furnishes the governing rule.”200
Regardless of which rule applies, however, the outcome would appear to favor the Hills.
Under the last shot rule, the terms of their agreement were defined at the time
Gateway shipped the computer. The contract included all of the default rules of Article
2, since the parties did not agree to any special contract terms of their own. Under UCC
§ 2-207(2) the terms on the writings inside the box should have been construed as
proposals for addition to the contract.201

Between merchants such proposals

automatically become part of the contract unless the offer expressly limit’s the terms of
acceptance to the terms of the offer, or they materially alter it, or the party receiving them
gives notice of objection to them within a reasonable time.202 The Hills were clearly
consumers and not merchants.203 UCC § 2-207(2) does not state any conditions under
which the proposed additional terms become part of the contract if the recipient is not a
merchant. Presumably they do not become part of the contract without the recipient’s
199
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200
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consent. Since the Hills did not consent to any of the additional terms, including the
arbitration clause, the additional terms could not have become part of the contract.
Under the knock out rule of UCC § 2-207(3) the contract would include all those
terms on which the writings of the parties agreed plus any supplemental terms included
under other provisions of Article 2.204 Since the Hills did not provide a writing, none of
the terms in Gateway’s writings could have been included in the contract unless they
would also have been included by other provisions of Article 2. Since none of the other
provisions of Article 2 would have implied an arbitration clause, the arbitration clause
clearly could not have become part of the contract under the knock out rule. It is doubtful
whether any of the other terms in Gateway’s writings could have become part of the
contract either. The terms of the contract could only have been those provided by the
default rules of Article 2.
Easterbrook has been widely criticized by scholars who argue that he did not
follow the UCC.205

Indeed, there seems little doubt that his ruling was motivated

primarily by policy considerations and that he relied on the ProCD precedent to
circumvent the implications of Article 2.

This is regrettable because it has only

confounded the effect of his ruling and compromised his objective, which appears to have
been to resolve the conundrum raised by “terms later” contracts for the sale of goods.206
Easterbrook clearly felt that utilitarian considerations favored a change in the rules, and
204
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“Payment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for air transportation, insurance, and many
other endeavors.” Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1149.
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there is good reason to believe he is right (although these are not the only considerations).
Requiring sellers to provide notice of the additional terms at the time of buyers’
telephone orders would raise significant evidentiary problems.207 How would sellers
prove that sufficient notice was given in every telephone order? Would every telephone
order have to be recorded and stored until the statute of limitations on any potential cause
of action expired? Would such recordings be admissible?
In spite of all the criticisms of Easterbrook’s opinion, it is not clear that adhering
to a strict interpretation of UCC § 2-206(1)(b) will ultimately prove to be in the best
interests of consumers. Forcing sellers to jump through hoops to contract around Article
2’s default rules or to simply forego arbitration clauses and other contractual
arrangements that reduce their expected legal costs will result in higher prices for goods
purchased through telephone orders. We can only speculate, but its seems reasonable to
guess that most consumers, if given the choice, would probably opt to subject themselves
to arbitration clauses and other reasonable limitations on their contract rights if it meant
getting the goods for lower prices.

After all, how many manufacturers offer “full

warranties” under the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act because consumers prefer to them
to limited warranties?208 How many consumers in general decline to make purchases
because they object to limited warranties and arbitration clauses?209 We do not have any
207
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systematic evidence, but casual observation suggests that most consumers are not willing
to pay much for contract rights with uncertain or unknown values. Of course, this may
reflect the limits on their rationality, and to the extent that it does, consumer protections
of some kind could be necessary to vindicate their rights and enhance the public welfare.
But those protections could take some form other than cumbrous constraints on sellers’
efforts to service telephone orders.210
The real problem with Hill v. Gateway seems to arise not from the rule that
Easterbrook fashioned, but from the cavalier way it dispenses with some of the values
that are deeply embedded in modern contract law. Most scholars and other commentators
would probably not object to a delay in the timing of contract formation if consumers
were made aware that additional terms they had not already explicitly assented to were
going to be added to their contracts unless they returned the goods within some
reasonable time. Indeed, some other courts have rejected arbitration clauses that sellers
included on writings inside the packaging of their goods on the grounds that the terms
had not been assented to.211

Judge Easterbrook seems to believe that consumers

commonly understand that important contract terms are included in writings on or inside
the packaging of goods; other scholars seem to disagree. The question could be resolved
through an empirical study, but that would probably be beside the point. The real issue is
whether consumers need to be protected from inadvertently waiving their Article 2 rights.
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Setting the controversy over the merits of his ruling aside, Judge Easterbrook
clearly sought to revise the law with his holding. His efforts have been at best a mixed
success. Although Hill v. Gateway has been followed in some cases,212 it has been
rejected in others.213 As things stand, the law governing the matter in most jurisdictions
is uncertain. The uncertainty arises not because Article 2 is unclear, or because state
courts have independently shown an inclination to modify it through liberal
interpretations, rather, it is unclear because the Seventh Circuit has provided a
controversial ruling on a question of state law where the state law was perfectly clear in a
conscious attempt to revise the law.

C. Failures of Limited Remedies and Exclusions of Consequential Damages
Most sophisticated manufacturers attempt to limit their liabilities for breach of
both express and implied warranties.214 They do so by making as few warranties as
possible, and by limiting buyers’ rights to damages for breaches of any warranties they
do make. The UCC regulates sellers’ attempts to exclude or modify express and implied
warranties in UCC § 2-316.215 It also regulates their attempts to exclude or limit damages
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in UCC § 2-379.216 Most sophisticated manufacturers attempt to make as few express
warranties as they can,217 and to exclude all implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness.218 They also commonly avail themselves of the provisions of UCC § 2-719(1) to
offer a limited remedy to repair or replace the goods in substitution for the remedies of
the UCC.219 In addition, to the extent that they can, they typically also exclude all
consequential damages.220

“to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability …the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied
warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.”.
216

U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (2005) states that “Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail

of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.” As official comment 1 explains,
“under subsection (2), where an apparently fair and reasonable clause because of circumstances fails in its
purpose or operates to deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must give way to the
general remedy provisions of this Article.”
217
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cannot be disclaimed (U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2005)), so it behooves sellers to avoid making any superfluous
warranties..
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This has created some confusion. Courts have struggled over the appropriate
interpretation of Article 2 in cases where sellers’ attempts to limit their buyers’ remedies
fail to satisfy the regulatory provisions of UCC § 2-719.221 According to UCC § 2719(2), when a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose, the buyer has recourse to all
the default remedies under Article 2.222 Of course, these include expectation damages
under UCC § 2-714223 as well as incidental and consequential damages under UCC § 2715.224 But UCC § 2-719 also allows sellers to exclude or limit a buyer’s right to
consequential damages.

The only regulations on the seller’s right to exclude

consequential damages are that the exclusion may not be unconscionable225 and that
consequential damages may not be excluded or limited for personal injury in the case
where the buyer is a consumer.226 Where the buyer is a merchant, therefore, the only
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regulation is that the exclusion may not be unconscionable, and since courts are reluctant
to apply the doctrine of unconscionability when invoked by a merchant,227 Article 2 in
effect places very little constraint on sellers’ ability to exclude consequential damages.
Confusion arises, however, when sellers’ limited remedies fail of their essential purpose
and the seller has also sought to exclude consequential damages in a separate and distinct
contract clause.
Does the provision in UCC § 2-719(2) which provides the buyer with recourse to
all the default remedies in Article 2 trump the additional clause purporting to exclude
consequential damages, or does the exclusion of consequential damages clause stand
independently of whether the limitation of remedy fails? The early case law held that the
failure of the limitation of remedy nullified the seller’s attempt to exclude consequential
damages.228

This was not a particularly convincing interpretation.

If the seller’s

limitation of remedy does not fail of its essential purpose then that alone will be sufficient
to deny the buyer any consequential damages.

Whether the contract includes an

additional clause purporting to exclude consequential damages will be irrelevant. If the
failure of the seller’s limitation of remedy clause nullifies the seller’s attempt to exclude
consequential damages then the additional clause purporting to exclude consequential
damages is again irrelevant. In other words, under this early reading of the Code, an
227
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additional contract clause purporting to exclude consequential damages under UCC § 2719(3) would have been irrelevant if the seller had also sought to limit the buyer’s
remedy under UCC § 2-719(1).
Since rational parties would not normally draft irrelevant contract terms, this is
not a particularly compelling interpretation of the Code.

A more convincing

interpretation, and the one that is dominant in the recent case law,229 would give an
independent effect to any contract clause that sought to exclude consequential damages.
Under this approach, whether the exclusion of consequential damages was effective
would be completely independent of whether the limitation of remedy failed of its
essential purpose. Thus, the limitation of remedy would be effective as long as it did not
fail of its essential purpose, and as long as it was effective, the exclusion of consequential
damages clause would be irrelevant. But if the limitation of remedy did fail of its
essential purpose the exclusion of consequential damages clause would remain effective
unless a court determined that it also failed for independent reasons.230 The clause
excluding consequential damages would provide an additional layer of protection for the
seller and would therefore at least serve an intelligible purpose.

Since a contract

interpretation that imputes an intelligible purpose to contract terms seems preferable to
one that does not, this seems the more compelling approach.
In a recent line of cases, however, the Ninth Circuit has confounded the question
by adopting a third approach. To begin with, in S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int’l., Inc.,231
229
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the Ninth Circuit predicted that California courts would treat the failure of a limited
remedy clause and the effectiveness of an exclusion of consequential damages clause as
independent questions232 (there were no state court precedents to follow), and upheld an
exclusion of consequential damages clause even though the limitation of remedy clause
failed of its essential purpose.233 This in itself was no great departure from the drift of the
case law. The court buttressed the rationale for its holding, however, by stating that “The
default of the seller is not so total and fundamental as to require that its consequential
damage limitation be expunged from the contract.”234 It may well have been true that
Smith’s default was not “total and fundamental”, but whatever that standard might mean,
it does not derive from Article 2. The Ninth Circuit seemed to suggest that if Smith’s
breach had been “total and fundamental” this would have justified expunging the
exclusion of consequential damages from the contract regardless of the UCC.
Since this was merely dicta, it did not by itself mark a departure from the
dominant approach, but in hindsight it foreshadowed a drift in Court’s jurisprudence.
The Ninth Circuit subsequently revisited the question in Fiorito Bros., Inc. v. Freuhauf
Corp., a case that arose under Washington law.235 The buyer in that case had contracted
for the purchase of thirteen dump truck bodies.236 The seller had created an express
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warranty that the truck bodies would be suitable for the purpose of transporting wet
concrete.237 When that turned out not to be true, the seller made no attempt to repair or
replace them. The question of the effect of the failure of the limitation of remedy clause
on the exclusion of consequential damages went to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit
reiterated its adherence to the “case-by-case” approach to determining whether the two
clauses were inseparable parts of the risk-allocation or independent,238 but this time held
that the exclusion of consequential damages was ineffective.239 The Ninth Circuit quoted
directly from the trial court’s opinion: “It cannot be maintained that it was the parties
intention that Defendant be enabled to avoid all consequential liability for breach by first
agreeing to an alternative remedy provision designed to avoid consequential harms, and
then scuttling that alternative through its recalcitrance in honoring the agreement.”240
Setting aside any questions about whether a limitation of remedy clause is
intended to prevent consequential harms,241 the most striking implication of this quotation
is that the Court apparently did not read the exclusion of consequential damages clause as
separate and distinct from the limitation of remedy clause. Of course, if the exclusion of
consequential damages is not made in a clause separate and distinct from the limitation of
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remedy clause then it cannot stand as a separate clause of the contract. Since there is no
other independent clause limiting the buyer’s damages, the failure of the limitation of
remedy clause is then tantamount to the failure of the limitation on the buyer’ right to
consequential damages. Perhaps viewed in this light, Fiorito did not mark such a drastic
departure from the case law either.
The Ninth Circuit revisited the question yet again, however, in Milgard
Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp.242 This time its treatment of the problem clearly did mark
a departure from the dominant approach. In Milgard the buyer transacted for the design
and delivery of a tempering furnace through what the Court described as a “carefully
negotiated contracted.”243

The seller, Selas, regarded the design of the furnace as

“experimental” but agreed to deliver it for what the Court clearly regarded as a hefty
price of $1.45 million.244 The contract also included some timeliness provisions. When
Selas was unable to meet these, the parties were initially able to settle out of court, but
when Selas failed to perform within the additional period provided under the settlement
agreement the case ensued.245 At trial Selas was initially granted a summary judgment,
but this was overturned on appeal.246 On remand the trial court held that the limited
remedy clause failed of its essential purpose and that Selas’ default was fundamental
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enough to nullify the exclusion of consequential damages.247 Milgard was awarded over
$1 million in net damages.248
Selas appealed on two grounds: first, that the trial court erred in holding that the
limited remedy clause failed of its essential purpose, and second, that the trial court erred
in holding that the failure of the limited remedy invalidated the exclusion of
consequential damages.249 Judge Hall upheld the trial court on the failure of the limited
remedy clause rather summarily and then addressed the question of consequential
damages at greater length. He rejected the notion that a characterization of the seller’s
breach as “total and fundamental” had any bearing on the effectiveness of an exclusion of
consequential damages clause and reiterated the Court’s aversion to “talismanic
analysis.”250 As he explained, the appropriate test was “whether Selas’ default caused a
loss which was not part of the bargained-for allocation of risk”.251 Indeed, this was the
test that the trial court had actually applied, and Judge Hall therefore also upheld the trial
court’s “decision to lift the cap on consequential damages.”252 As he explained, “Milgard
did not agree to pay $1.45 million in order to participate in a science experiment.”253
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Here Judge Hall not only departed from the drift of the case law, he comes close
to contradicting some of the fundamental principles of modern contract law. The opinion
reprints both the limited remedy and the exclusion of consequential damages clauses,
which were contained in the same paragraph of the writing. It is instructive to reprint this
paragraph here:254
In the event of a breach of any warranty, express implied or statutory, or in the even the
equipment is found to be defective in workmanship or material or fails to conform to the
specifications thereof, [Selas] liability shall be limited to the repair or replacement of
such equipment as is found to be defective or non-conforming, provided that written
notice of any such defect or non-conformity must be given to Selas within 1 year from
the date of acceptance, or 15 months from completion of shipment, whichever first
occurs. In the event that acceptance is delayed through the fault of Selas, then the Selas 1
year warranty shall be applicable and shall not begin until the date of acceptance. Selas
assumes no liability for no [sic] consequential or incidental damages of any kind
(including fire or explosion in the starting, testing, or subsequent operation of the
equipment), and the Purchaser assumes all liability for the consequences of its use or
misuse by the Purchaser or his employees. In no event shall Selas be liable for damages
resulting from the non-operation of Purchaser’s plant, loss of product, raw materials, or
production as a result of the use, misuse or inability to use the equipment covered by this
proposal….

A plain reading of this paragraph clearly indicates that the limitation of remedy
and exclusion of consequential damages clauses were separate and distinct.

The

limitation of remedy in contained in the first sentence; the exclusion of consequential
damages is contained in the subsequent two sentences. In fact, the second sentence
excludes consequential damages associated with the use or misuse of the furnace, and the
254

Id. at 707
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third sentence excludes any damages associated with the buyer’s inability to use the
furnace. The damages that Milgard incurred consisted primarily of lost profits as a result
of its inability to use the furnace.255 These damages should have been excluded by the
third sentence. The wording was clear that “In no event” should Selas have been liable
for damages resulting from Milgard’s inability to use the furnace.256 Presumably, that
was meant to include the event of the limited remedy failing of its essential purpose.
Together with the fact that this third sentence is separated from the limitation of remedy
clause by the second sentence, the wording clearly implies that the exclusion of
consequential damages was separate and distinct from the limitation of remedy and
intended to provide Selas with an additional layer of protection.
Judge Hall nonetheless nullified the effect of this exclusion of damages on the
grounds that it had not been bargained-for.257 A clear clause in a writing is normally
evidence of what the parties had bargained-for, especially when the court characterizes
the contract as one that was “carefully negotiated.”258 In this case, however, Judge Hall
looked to Milgard’s consideration – a price of $1.45 million – and inferred that the
exclusion of consequential damages was not part of the bargain. Although the inclusion
of a clause limiting the buyer’s right to damages in a contract with such a high price
might be considered so grossly unfair as to shock a court’s conscience, this by itself could
only satisfy one prong of the test for unconscionability.259 For the unconscionability
255
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doctrine to apply there must also have been some procedural abuse in the negotiation of
the contract that exposed the party to an unfair surprise.260 Since the court acknowledged
that the contract in this case was “carefully negotiated”261 that could hardly have been the
case.
Judge Hall seemed to believe that Milgard could not possibly have agreed to such
a sweeping exclusion of consequential damages. As he put it, Milgard did not agree to
pay $1.45 million for a “science experiment.”262 But here Judge Hall comes very close to
contradicting one of the fundamental principles of modern contract law, alternatively
known as the “adequacy doctrine “or the “peppercorn theory.” Under the peppercorn
theory263 courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration in determining whether
there is an enforceable contract; the mere fact of consideration itself is sufficient.264 In
Milgard, Judge Hall looks to the buyer’s consideration – a price of $1.45 million – as
evidence of what the buyer had bargained-for and concludes that it must have been more
than a furnace with a limited remedy and no consequential damages regardless of
whether the limited remedy failed of its essential purpose. But the parties’ writing clearly
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As the Batsakis court held “Mere inadequacy of
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included a separate and distinct clause excluding consequential damages. Judge Hall
looks to Milgard’s consideration – primarily the contract price – as evidence of Selas’
consideration – whether Selas was to provide consequential damages in the event its
limited remedy failed.

In treating Milgard’s consideration as evidence that Selas’

consideration must have been more than merely a furnace with a limited remedy and no
consequential damages, even though there was a separate and distinct contract clause that
clearly excluded consequential damages, Judge Hall came very close to holding that
Selas’ consideration under the contract was inadequate.
Some commentators have written favorably about this approach to the problem.265
While there is nothing in principle wrong with a court looking to the parties’
consideration as a means of determining the scope of their bargain, Judge Hall’s opinion
in Milgard goes further. It looks to the buyer’s consideration to trump a separate and
distinct clause in the writing excluding consequential damages. In this regard, it comes
close to making a judgment about the adequacy of the seller’s consideration. To put the
matter in perspective, could Judge Hall have held that the contract price was not in fact
$1.45 million, in spite of the clear evidence otherwise, simply because the writing
included a clause excluding consequential damages and because no sensible buyer would
have paid that much for the furnace without the right to consequential damages in the
event that the limited remedy failed? The only circumstance that prevents Judge Hall’s
decision from blatantly violating the adequacy of consideration doctrine is some lingering
doubt about whether the clause excluding consequential damages was truly understood
by the buyer to be separate and distinct from the limited remedy clause.
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Fortunately, Judge Hall’s decision has not been widely followed.266 Nonetheless,
it injects some additional uncertainty into many commercial sales transactions. Sellers
who wish to provide themselves with a layer of protection against consequential damages
claims beyond the one provided by a limited remedy clause may have difficulty in doing
so. Writing a separate and distinct clause that clearly excludes consequential damages
may not be enough. In the event of a dispute a court may decide to follow the Ninth
Circuit’s precedent in Milgard, and hold that the buyer’s consideration is large enough to
trump a plain reading of the writing.

D. Summary
These three cases offer concrete examples of how federal courts in three different
Circuits have used their discretion in conscious attempts to reinterpret and revise modern
sales law.

In Advent Systems Judge Weis of the Third Circuit held that computer

software was a good within the meaning of Article 2 even though the question was not
directly raised by the case; he thus sought to bring within the scope of the UCC a wide
range of transactions in computer information that might otherwise have been governed
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by state common law.267 In Hill v. Gateway Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit
followed a dubious precedent instead of the letter of Article 2 in a bold attempt to revise
the rules of contract formation and legitimize “terms later” contracts in sales
transactions.268 And in Milgard, Judge Hall of the Ninth Circuit stretched the “case-bycase” approach to determining the effectiveness of damage exclusion clauses when
limited remedy clauses fail so far that he came very close to contradicting the adequacy
of consideration doctrine.269

In each case the court based its holding on policy

considerations rather than state legal authorities or predictions about how the state
supreme court would rule. And in each case one wonders whether a state court would
have felt emboldened or motivated to render a similar holding in the face of the same
questions.
In Advent Systems the Third Circuit overruled the district court’s decision to apply
Pennsylvania common law instead of Article 2.270 Judge Weis looked to the language
used in the writing, the manner of billing, and the nature of the items that had been
contracted for in a manner consistent with the predominant factor test.271 He could have
easily held that Article 2 applied on this basis alone without also holding that computer
software is a good. Indeed, one wonders whether a Pennsylvania Superior Court would
have done the same.272 Since the holding was completely unnecessary to the disposition
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of the case, any state court judge should have feared being overruled on the matter by the
state supreme court. Moreover, one wonders whether any state court judge would have
had the same motivation to extend the scope of Article 2. Was the volume of contract
cases involving computer software in Pennsylvania large enough to have made the matter
so important? Judge Weis purported to apply Pennsylvania law to the case, but it is clear
that he looked well beyond Pennsylvania’s borders when making his utilitarian
calculations.
Similar observations can be made about Hill v. Gateway and Milgard. In Hill v.
Gateway Judge Easterbrook declined to follow Article 2, even though it seemed to offer a
clear answer to the question raised by the case.273 Would any judge on the Appellate
Court of Illinois have ignored the state statute in favor of a Seventh Circuit precedent that
clearly also ignored the state statute?274 That is difficult to imagine. Would any judge on
the Appellate Court of Illinois -- subject to reelection every six years275 -- have
disregarded an Illinois statute to take the side of a corporate computer manufacturer
against a consumer? That is also difficult to imagine. It is perhaps easier to imagine how
a judge on the Washington Court of Appeals276 could have relied on the size of the
contract price to invalidate an exclusion of consequential damages clause, as Judge Hall
did in Milgard.277 But it is still not easy. Judge Hall’s holding in Milgard developed a
line of jurisprudence that the Ninth Circuit began in S.M. Wilson & Co. and continued in
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Fiorito.278 In S.M Wilson & Co. the Ninth Circuit purported to apply California law and
in Fiorito it purported to apply Washington law.279 The Ninth Circuit thus predicted that
the state supreme courts in both California and Washington would depart from the
dominant approach in favor of a “case-by-case” analysis. How plausible is that? Judge
Hall’s deference to Washington law in Milgard was obviously no more than a formality;
the Ninth Circuit was clearly developing its own jurisprudence.
All three cases illustrate how the federal courts have often used their discretion in
conscious attempts to reinterpret and revise modern sales law. Indeed, they illustrate how
little regard the federal courts have sometimes paid to state legal authorities or their
obligation to predict how the state supreme court would rule on the same question in
sales law cases. Instead, as the examples suggest, they have often looked to broader
policy considerations in attempts to fashion rules that are not only consonant with their
utilitarian calculations, but will transcend jurisdictional boundaries. In this regard, they
are behaving much as if they were still in the Swift v. Tyson era, when the federal courts
commonly appealed to the law of the merchant in attempts to construct a body of general
commercial law that cohered with the underlying principles of commerce.

CONCLUSION
Almost seventy years after the Supreme Court sought to rationalize the American
system of judicial federalism in Erie, sales law remains trapped in a pattern more
reminiscent of the Swift v. Tyson era. The extraordinarily wide separation of powers in
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the NCCUSL-ALI uniform law-making process has entrenched Article 2 of the UCC in
the status quo. Concurrently, an imbalance between the federal and state courts in the
American system of judicial federalism has conferred an unusually wide range of
discretion over state commercial law on the federal courts. Ironically, therefore, state
sales statutes are being reinterpreted and revised by the federal courts rather than the state
legislatures or state courts. The federal courts are thus the most important source of
innovation and experimentation in modern American sales law, but the role they play is
not entirely consistent with modern notions of democracy and judicial restraint.
Moreover, it is debatable whether they have brought much rationality and coherence to
the law or simply injected uncertainty and disharmony instead.
At this point it appears that the pattern will persist. Thus, the federal courts will
probably remain the most important source of new developments in sales law for some
time to come. But it is doubtful whether these developments will converge and therefore
whether sales law will remain uniform. Indeed, the converse seems far more likely.
Neither federal nor state courts have rushed to follow cases such as Advent Systems, Hill
v. Gateway, and Milgard, which have rendered important new holdings on fundamental
questions of the law, and it appears unlikely that they will do so anytime soon. It seems
inevitable that American sales law will continue to diverge, not only across jurisdictions
but further and further away from the rickety framework of Article 2. American sales
law therefore will not only continue to devolve into something more akin to the common
law, it will remain an area of disjunction in which the federal courts play the dominant
role in developing the law, even though the law is still formally within the authority of
the states.

